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Abstract: This paper examines the role of two types of reputation - borrower credit history 
and productivity - in disequilibrium supply and demand models of loan size dynamics in formal 
and informal credit markets.  Using panel data on Honduran households, full- and partial-
information regime switching econometric models yield four principal findings: (1) credit 
contracts in the formal sector are largely collateral driven and not reputation driven; (2) the 
informal sector credit contracts are borrower reputation based; (3) the informal sector utilizes 
positive/negative credit histories in both markets to credibly reward/punish borrowers; and (4) 
technical efficiency has a positive impact in determining loan size in both sectors on the demand 
and supply side of the market. 
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An Empirical Investigation of Reputation and Loan Size 
Dynamics in Rural Credit Markets in Honduras 
I. Introduction 
Economists have worked long and hard to understand the basic logic of rural credit market 
imperfections and their potential impacts on efficiency, equity, and poverty outcomes. Much 
attention has been focused on the theoretical and empirical determinants of credit market (non-
price) rationing which excludes certain classes of borrowers, usually the asset-poor, from 
securing formal sector and to a lesser extent informal sector loans (Bell et. al. (1997), Carter 
(1988), Hoff and Stiglitz (1993), Jaffee and Russell (1976), Kochar (1997a,b)).  Recent research 
and policy experiments are exploring how reforms (such as credit bureaus and information 
exchange among micro-enterprise lenders) aimed at sharing information on borrower reputation 
might help to broaden and hasten credit market access (Bannerjee and Duflo (2000), Padilla and 
Pagano (2000), Pagano and Japelli (1993), McIntosh and Wydick (2005), Louto et. al (2007)) and 
thus the productivity and welfare of rural producers.  
This article attacks a distinct but related question by examining the role of borrower 
reputation in shaping loan size outcomes in rural Honduras, where reputation is considered to 
have two potentially observable features.  One is credit repayment history, and the other is 
technical efficiency.  Using disequilibrium models of loan supply and demand for the formal 
sector and the informal sector, the econometric analysis explores the role of reputation in loan 
size dynamics while controlling for the other factors often incorporated into analyses of credit 
market outcomes.  The intention is to identify whether improving information flows about 
reputation might serve as a substitute and/or complement to the recent policy initiatives that have 
emphasized land market and titling reforms as a way to help improve credit market outcomes 
(Boucher et al. 2006).   3 
Several recent theoretical forays have considered how the provision of dynamic incentives by 
lenders might be used to manage credit market risk (Diamond, 1989; Ghosh and Ray, 1996, 2001; 
Mookherjee and Ray, 2003; McIntosh and Wydick, 2005 and Vercammen, 1995).  This class of 
models provides a rationale for explaining the persistence of long-term relationships that may or 
may not attain first-best outcomes, but do allow borrowers to build a reputation through good 
repayment habits that help to secure continued access to credit, generally on progressively better 
terms.  Lenders, in turn, reduce their risk of default (and other costs) by actively gathering 
information about the borrowers’ abilities to supplement their experience regarding repayment 
history.  The model that we develop focuses precisely on the tenuous balance that can arise 
between a borrower’s credit history and the lender’s knowledge about their productivity.  The 
balance is critical to attain the so-called disciplining effect of providing the borrower both positive 
incentives and potential penalties that make their good reputation worth maintaining.   
One fundamental question is whether these dynamic incentive approaches apply in some 
segments of rural credit markets and not in others.  Specifically, we develop two competing ways 
of viewing lender-borrower relationships.  The first is a pure reputation model that we believe 
provides a useful structure for understanding informal credit markets.  The second is a collateral-
leveraging hypothesis that in a parallel fashion seems to provide a useful structure for 
understanding formal credit markets.  The empirical analysis essentially attempts to identify the 
degree to which the predictions of the two models fit the observed outcomes for rural Honduran 
households in informal and formal credit markets using panel data from 1994 and 2001.  Because 
of the major differences in the lending institutions, the contractual design and terms of loans, and 
often the characteristics of borrowers who are active in the two markets, we treat the two as 
distinct markets. We also have different information sets about them from the household surveys 
that were done on credit market experiences. In the case of the formal sector, we have sufficient 
data to estimate a full-information disequilibrium analysis, while in the case of the informal   4 
sector we only have data sufficient to support a partial information disequilibrium analysis.  The 
characteristics of data are more fully detailed in section IV and in the data appendix. 
The nature of the data is also one of the reasons the econometric models of the formal sector 
and informal sector are examined as separate markets. Bell et al., (1997) and Carter and Olinto, 
(2003) assumed households that are rationed (perhaps for lack of collateral) in the formal credit 
market “spillover” into the informal sector where they get otherwise inferior loan contracts, ones 
with higher interest rates, shorter terms, and smaller amounts.  Kochar (1997b), on the other hand, 
assumes that borrowers may choose to transact in the formal or informal credit sector depending 
on which is the low cost sector for them. This paper makes a more agnostic assumption of simply 
separating the credit markets and examining them for how loan sizes evolve based on normal 
factors that would condition credit market outcomes (titled land, education) as well as on 
reputation.  While it would certainly be more robust to develop a joint estimation framework for 
outcomes in the two sectors, the dimensionality curse of our disequilibrium models of supply and 
demand make joint estimation intractable.  Because we are focusing more on the loan size 
dynamics of borrowers in these markets rather than on their participation choices, the 
dimensionality constraint that demands separate analyses is not as troublesome as it might 
otherwise be.  The estimations are done using maximum likelihood methods, and we run both 
restricted and unrestricted models, with the restricted ones including only the reputation and/or 
collateral effects appropriate to that sector. 
The main results of the estimations are that reputation, both in terms of repayment history and 
revealed technical efficiency, shape loan size outcomes in informal credit markets.  By contrast, 
borrower reputation has relatively little impact on formal sector lending outcomes, whereas 
physical and human capital assets play a more pivotal role.  Titled land, in particular, proves to be 
essential in both securing loans and in the size of the loans offered.  Information flows on 
borrower history do matter across sectors, but perhaps in the reverse direction from what policy 
makers might hope.  Credit history in the formal sector does shape informal sector lending   5 
outcomes but not visa versa.  Overall, these findings also underscore the apparent segmentation of 
credit markets in Honduras that like elsewhere in Latin America limit poorer households to 
informal sector lending options (Guirkinger and Boucher, forthcoming; Barham et al., 1996; 
Carter and Olinto, 2003).  The good news is that those informal options appear to provide some 
potential for capitalizing on reputation with larger and better loan terms over time.  The bad news 
is that the information and institutional structures do not yet provide asset-poor farmers a clear 
path to formal sector loan opportunities based on reputation. 
This rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical framework of 
loan size dynamics based on reputation and collateral leveraging. Section 3 motivates the 
disequilibrium, separate sector approach, and then explains the estimation strategy for the 
disequilibrium sectoral loan supply and demand equations. Section 4 presents pertinent 
descriptive statistics, and results of the estimation.  Section 5 concludes. 
II.    Theoretical Framework 
The purpose of this section is to develop two models of the dynamics of loan size that capture 
the pertinent differences of informal and formal lending markets in rural areas and to help 
motivate the empirical disequilibrium model of loan size dynamics.  The models are stylized 
representations of the two sectors.  For example, the informal lending market is assumed to have 
no collateral provision and to pivot entirely on dynamic reputation incentives to ensure borrower 
good behavior.  In contrast, the formal market is assumed to center on collateral provision and 
allow only repayment history as a form of reputation that can be used to increase the degree of 
leverage provided by the collateral.  The purpose of these models is to develop a consistent 
representation of how loan size dynamics might evolve for different classes of borrowers in these 
sectors, but the actual econometric examinations will consider the full roles of reputation and 
collateral leveraging in both sectors to test whether the logic of these markets is as distinct as 
portrayed here.   6 
i.  Pure Reputation Hypothesis 
The theoretical framework outlined in this sub-section summarizes a multi-period model 
developed in Sundaram-Stukel, 2005. The existence of informal sector supply schedules hinge on 
three main assumptions: (i) credit is extended without collateral; (ii) all qualifying incumbent 
borrowers are extended trial loans; and (iii) there are no legal mechanisms in place to enforce 
these credit contracts. We assume that the informal sector consists of a large number of borrowers 
and finite number of informal lenders. Thus, repayment is achieved through incentives of future 
access and contract terms. Lending can be profitable only if loan contracts are designed in such a 
way as to induce good borrowers to repay.  
All borrowers are identical expect with respect to their productivity     (innate ability). Access 
to credit depends on borrowers’ productivity (or business know how). Adverse selection exists 
because lenders cannot discern this productivity parameter (   ) for incumbent borrowers. 
However, through repeated interaction lenders are able to indirectly estimate a borrower’s 
productivity parameter. In this environment we define borrower reputation as follows: credit 
history R , which includes repayment, defaults and arrears and an expected borrower productivity 
parameter     E( ). Each period lenders revise their prior expectationof the borrowers’ productivity 
(   ) through Bayesian updating
1. We start by assuming the existence of a decision rule employed 
by lenders to determine the size of a loan advanced      Q( ,R), where future loan sizes are thus a 
function of repayment and expected productivity. 
The precise decision rule defines a threshold level of expected productivity parameter 
       Et( ) =    below which lenders will not find it profitable to lend at period t=0. Since at the 
                                                         
1 Informal lenders excluding moneylenders are often privy to detailed information such as output either 
through direct or indirect monitoring. For example, if the primary source of credit for a rural farmer is 
coffee exporters then this type of credit is often tied to the sale of coffee to exporter. The coffee exporter 
thus has detailed information regarding the output stream (or productive capacity) of the borrower. The 
theoretical model shows that lenders use the output streams to estimate the productivity parameter.   7 
beginning of a credit relationship lenders do not know     well, the decisions are based on the 
lenders priors on a borrowers’ productivity. For the sake of expositional ease, let us assume   Q0is 
the trial loan size for a new borrower who is eligible with       E0( ) =   . Mathematically we can 
restate the above condition as: 
     
S0
I =
= Q0 if E( ) > 
= 0 if E( ) < 
 
 
   
     
                              (1) 
  As can be seen from equation 1 only those borrowers with prior     above the threshold 
value of    will qualify for trial loans. Outright default during trial phase results in no future 
access to credit in the informal market. Benefits to reputation depend critically on good behavior, 






The evolution of loan sizes and underlined reputation effects are summarized in the following 
cases of interest: 
Case 1. Incumbent Borrower with Bad Reputation 
A household with a negative history at     t = 0 , will be rationed and face a zero supply of credit 
(     Q = 0) in all     t > 0. The reason for this is that a bad history in the beginning of the relationship 
should credibly exclude a potential borrower from participating in the credit market. 
Case 2. Perfect Reputation with Perfect Repayment Performance 
A household with a positive reputation history will face a supply of credit      Q  [Q0,Qi( i)]and 
belongs to the non-rationed regime (Figure 1.1). This is the case where the borrowers reputation 
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E(η).   8 
estimate of productivity parameter . Note with repeated interactions the lender will be able to 
get a precise estimate of the borrowers’ productivity and thus, tailor a loan amount to exactly 
match the borrowers’ capacity to repay. That is at period t=T the borrower will receive a loan 
amount exactly consistent with his productive capacity,      Q   QT( i) 
Case 3. Perfect Reputation at Entry with Fluctuating Repayment Performance 
A household with a positive reputation history will face a supply of credit in period t=2, after 
trial at t=0, of      Q2 = [Q0,Q1) (Figure 1). This corresponds to the case where the lender’s prior 
indicated that the borrower was credit worthy but a bad performance, in period t=2, triggered 
either a revision of the estimate of borrower productivity or a punishment strategy, such that the 
borrower received a loan less than or equal to the loan at period t=1. Note the lender will re-
estimate the borrower productivity parameter each period until s/he has a precise estimate. If the 
prior belief about the borrowers’ credit worthiness was wrong, then future bad performances will 
result in no future credit access to the borrower.  
 
 
      (a)            (b) 
Figure 1:   Productivity-effort Supply Trajectories 
 
Overall, then, there will be borrowers who are rationed in informal sectors because of low 
productivity and/or bad repayment history. Other borrowers will be rewarded with increases in   9 
informal lending based on their reputation, with the largest loan sizes going to those borrowers 
who combine both strong repayment records with high productivity.  
ii.  Collateral Leveraging Hypothesis 
Now let us consider the case where repeated interaction does not reveal information about the 
borrower’s productivity. In this case, lenders rely on indirect mechanisms (i.e. the terms of the 
credit contract like collateral requirement and repayment history) to mitigate default risk (Hoff 
and Stiglitz (1993))
2. Based on a survey of lenders in Honduras, we found that bank loans are 
heavily collateralized, with little variation in interest rates, and are tied to collateral, with new 
borrowers receiving loan sizes equal to a lower percentage of their collateral compared to 
borrowers with an established relationship with a lender.
3  Indeed, the vast majority of surveyed 
lenders in Honduras indicated that first time and delinquent borrowers receive loan amounts of no 
more than 50% of collateral value whereas previous borrowers with clean histories received loan 
amounts of up to 80% of their collateral value. The framework developed here relies heavily on 
the theoretical model developed in Vercammen (1995). While Vercammen argues that reputation 
effects increase borrower welfare through the lowering of interest rates, we postulate here that 
positive reputation effects provide higher leveraging power on collateral assets.  Again the timing 





                                                         
2 While interest rates could potentially be lower for borrowers with good reputations. In the Honduran 
context, the data reveals very little interest rate variation. However, the theoretical arguments provided in 
(McIntosh and Wydick, 2005 and Vercammen, 1995) can be extended to model quantity as well. 
Furthermore, Hoff and Stiglitz (1993) offers a thorough discussion of the policy implications of both the 
direct and indirect screening mechanisms. 
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   10 
Thus, we assume that collateral is the preferred indirect mechanism for reducing information 
problems, and that a good repayment history enables borrowers to increase the leverage on their 
collateral.  In order to explore the notional supply trajectories of loan contracts in the formal 
market, we need to first identify which class of households could potentially benefit from 
dynamic incentives. There are three distinct regimes to consider: 
Regime 1:    C > C  
This corresponds to the case where households have enough collateral assets to leverage the 
full amount of loan they might want, and are therefore not on the short side of the credit market 
(Stiglitz & Weiss (1981), Hoff and Stiglitz (1993), Kochar (1997a), Conning (1999)). Thus, these 
households do not benefit from the leveraging of collateral and do not need dynamic incentives.   
Regime 2:    C < C 
This class of household is either rationed and faces a zero supply      Q = 0or face a positive 
supply that is proportional to the level of collateral assets but is not worth the transactions cost of 
securing the loan.  If they face a zero supply, it need not mean that they have a negative history in 
period     t = 0; it could be due to a variety of reasons such as the formal or informal sector having 
lower limits on the loan amounts they consider profitable. The body of work on why poor 
households are more vulnerable to rationing is enormous, and we refer the interested reader to 
Hoff et al. (1993) and Ghosh et al. (2000) for a good review. While households in this class might 
benefit most from dynamic incentives, they do not have enough collateral to secure viable entry 
to the market. For these households the pure reputation driven contracts would be most beneficial. 
Regime 3:      C  [C,C] 
This class of households can benefit most from collateral leveraging because they have 
sufficient collateral to access the market, but cannot secure the full loan they might want with an 
initial loan.  
   11 
                     
                            (a)                                                                              (b) 
Figure 2:  Collateral Leveraged Supply Trajectories 
 
Figure 2 diagrammatically presents the possible trajectories of the evolution of loan sizes for 
households in this class with negative priors or seeking their first loan. Unlike the borrower 
reputation driven case, where a history includes both the repayment history and an expected 
productivity parameter of the borrower, here reputation solely reflects the repayment history of a 
borrower. Thus, a negative history denotes either non-repayment or arrears, and no history is 
equated to a negative history.  
Since households generally do not exhibit large variations in collateral assets from year to 
year, we assume that a household has the same level of collateral in all three periods. The 
horizontal axis represents time and the vertical axis denotes the loan amount as a percent of 
collateral. Let us consider an example of the possible trajectory for a household with an initial 
negative prior. That is, at period t=0 the lender is not convinced of the borrowers 
creditworthiness. In this case, the lender advances a loan amount equal to   0
_  of the collateral 
value (for example    
0 = 40%). If this borrower proves to be creditworthy, then s/he receives up 
to     2
+(> 0
 )of collateral value in period t=2 (dashed line in Figure 2a; where   
2 could equal 
80% of collateral value). However, if this borrower has negative repayment history in period t=1 
then, their capacity to leverage collateral will depend greatly on the extent of the negative   12 
experience. That scenario is depicted in Figure 2b with the loan size heading down to     1
  of 
collateral or heading back up over time (dotted line in Figure 2b).   
For borrowers who have a positive initial prior, or a positive history, then they might start in 
period t=0 with a loan amount        
Q0 =  0C  (for example, 60% of collateral) value and may end 
with loans up to 
       
Q1 =  1C  where 
      1 >  0 (maybe 80% of collateral value) in the next period, 
that is t=1. In this sense, positive priors combined with positive repayment allow borrowers to 
leverage collateral more efficiently than borrowers with checkered histories. 
  Again, there will be borrowers who are fully constrained, partially constrained, and 
unconstrained.  For the partially constrained, collateral leveraging ratios will depend positively on 
repayment history but will be expected to be less than one regardless. 
 
III.  Estimation of Disequilibrium Models of Formal and Informal Credit 
Markets 
 
We begin this section with a graphical portrayal of the range of credit market outcomes that 
are possible for borrowers in the formal and informal sectors.  The portrayal takes into account 
the potential for full to partial to no supply side constraints and variations in demand for both 
formal and informal sectors, which combined give rise to a wide range of possible disequilibrium 
configurations.  This “spaceship” of credit market outcomes provides the basic motivation for the 
disequilibrium S-D approach to estimation and the dimensionality rationale for the segmentation 
of the two lending markets.  Next we lay out the basic D-S disequilibrium model.  Then we tailor 
this model to the full-information context of the formal market (where we elicited full 
information from survey respondents about their experience in the credit market) and to the 
partial information context of the informal market (where our surveys did not elicit full rationing 
information).  The direct elicitation methodology is now common in credit market studies 
barham  7/12/07 2:54 PM
Comment: Where is this portrayed in Figure 
1.2?   13 
(citations), but is more fully discussed in the data appendix.  Finally, we discuss the unrestricted 
and restricted versions of the models that we run to examine the role of reputation and collateral-
leveraging in the different loan markets. 
i.  Empirical Motivation for the Disequilibrium, Segmented Modeling Approach 
With two supply and demand schedules for lending outcomes in the formal and informal 
sector, the number of distinct market outcomes is of the magnitude 2
4, or 16 distinct observational 
outcomes.  Figure 3 represents 12 of these possibilities starting at the top with the demand side 
and then following down the supply side possibilities, which allow for unconstrained, partially 
constrained, and fully constrained outcomes.
4  The partially constrained outcome captures the 
situation of a borrower who receives a loan but for a lower quantity than they would have 
preferred at the going terms. 
Many of the outcomes in Figure 3 are “disequilibrium” outcomes (i.e., ones where supply 
does not meet demand).  Case 3, for example is one where the borrower has demand for formal 
credit but the lender will not supply a loan, while in Case 4 the borrower has demand for formal 
and informal credit but only receives informal credit.  Including the partial constraint outcomes, 
Figure 3 has 6 cases of disequilibrium outcomes including 3 where borrowers are partially 
constrained in credit markets (cases 10, 11, 12).   
The actual joint estimation of a model with 16 or 12 distinct regimes, although theoretically 
straightforward, poses severe computational problems because of the need to consider two 
notional demands and two notional supplies.  This implies that the distribution functions involved 
are quadrivariate normal distributions. The computational time required for such an estimation 
approach makes it impractical.  Moreover, the possibility of convergence to “false maxima” due 
                                                         
4 Four possibilities are not mapped.  Three would go below case 1 and would map out three supply 
possibilities associated with zero demand.  Case 5 captures two in one with no supply from either sector.   14 
 
Figure 2.1:  Spaceship: Credit Market Participation Outcomes 
to non-zero covariance structure of the error terms is also cited in the literature as a potential 
problem (Maddala (1983), Goldfeld and Quandt (1978)). This problem arises because at certain 
parameter values, the likelihood may be maximized at the boundary of the parameter space with a 
correlation coefficient of   ±1. This results in a singular covariance matrix.    15 
In order to keep the estimation tractable, we estimate the notional demands and supplies for 
the formal and informal lending sectors, separately. The limitation of this approach is that we lose 
the ability to discuss the impact of borrower reputation on associated spillover demand, a topic 
explored in Sundarem-Stukel (2005). However, here our primary goal is to understand the effect 
of borrower reputation on loan size, and so we abstract away from spillover demand.  
ii.  The Basic Demand-Supply Disequilbrium Approach 
The demand schedule for agricultural credit can be derived by solving the optimization 
problem for the ith household.
5  For the present purposes we assume a household’s demand 
schedule for credit is denoted by   D(ri : Xi,  i, i, d,u1), where  ri  denotes the effective interest 
rate faced by a household for a given loan size;  Xi is a vector of observable household 
characteristics such as farm size, education etc;    i represents credit market experience; 
  irepresents the contribution of productivity to the household’s notional demand for credit;    u1is  
a demand shifter that captures household characteristics unobservable to the econometrician (for 
example, managerial skill and/or risk aversion); and   d is the vector of demand parameters. 
We have two supply schedules that are available to households depending on their choice of 
credit sector. Solving the lender’s maximization problem yields the notional supply schedule
6. 
The notional supply schedules faced by household i, are represented 
by
     





j), where j = F,I . This schedule specifies all the 
   
(r j,S ji) pairs offered to 
the ith household, where 
 
S ji  is the maximum loan amount offered to the ith household from 
sector j at interest rate  r j  based on the household characteristics. Here, 
 
Z jiis the vector of 
household characteristics observed by the lender,    i
jis the vector characterizing the borrowers’ 
                                                         
5 We refer the readers to Bell et. al. (1997) for the derivation of the supply and demand schedules. 
6 We refer interested readers to Bell et. al. (1997), Kochar (1997b), and Sundaram-Stukel (2005) for a 
derivation of the notional supply schedules.   16 
participation history in the credit market, and   i
j captures the borrowers’ productivity parameter 
inferred by the lender. As lenders observe only some borrower characteristics, the vector 
 
Z ji may 
not include all the elements in Xi . Further, the vector of household characteristics observed by the 
informal sector may differ from that of the formal i.e.,   ZFi   ZIi . 
In the absence of rationing and with perfect price adjustment the equilibrium is characterized 
by supply and demand equality in each of the lending sectors. Mathematically we can represent 
this condition by:   
     
Qij = Sij = Dij, j = F,I                                                    (2) 
where 
 
Qij is the equilibrium quantity transacted in the credit sector j by household i. In the 
presence of credit market imperfections, however, the quantity transacted in the loan sector may 
not be an equilibrium outcome. As discussed above, lenders may condition loan amounts based 
on the household’s collateral assets, borrower reputation and other observable household specific 
characteristics; thus, loan supply can be lower than the desired amounts. Mathematically we 
restate the aforementioned condition as: 
     
Qij = min{Sij,Dij}          (3) 
This model implies that if the household is rationed in sector j then, 
   
Sij = Qij < Dijwhere, 
 
Qij is generated by the supply function. On the other hand, if the household is not rationed, 
then
   
Qij = Dij, and the resulting quantity
 
Qij are generated by the demand curve N.  
For the purpose of the estimation of the disequilibrium model, consider the linear 
approximations of the household demand and sectoral supply schedules specified as: 
     
Di
j = max{0, X1 1 +  i 
1 
j + i 
1p
j + u1}= max{0,Di
*j}
Si
j = max{0, Zi
j 2
j +  i
j 2 
j + i 2p
j + u2}= max{0,Si
*j}
        (4)   17 
where     j = F,I and   Di
*j and    Si
*j are, respectively, the latent notional household demand and 
supply in the formal and informal sector. The parameters       k , k =1,2  capture the marginal effects 
of household characteristics,   Xi 's and Zi
j 's; the 
   
 k 
j 's capture the marginal effect of credit market 
experience; the 
   
 
k 
j 's are the marginal effect of a borrower’s productivity on loan supply and 
demand, and the uk ’s are the error terms accounting for household-specific omitted variables. We 
assume that within a given sector (j = F, I), the error terms are distributed bivariate normal with a 
mean of zero and the variance covariance matrix given by: 
















                    (5) 
Thus we are assuming that the error terms are correlated with each other. Given the above 
specification, the observed loan amount for household i in each sector is given by: 





*j], j = F,I               (6) 
We use this structure to recover the demand and supply parameters, where    f (Di
*j,Si
*j) 
represents the joint density of   Si
*j ,   Di
*j  conditional on   Xi 's and Zi
j 's. Based on the rationing and 
observed loan supply and demand information obtained from the Honduras dataset, we estimate 
both a full-information and a partial-information regime switching model in the formal and 
informal sectors, respectively. In the subsequent section we discuss the different regimes that 
arise in the two sectors. 
iii.  Estimation of the Formal Sector 
In the formal sector, both the level of rationing and the sample separation are known; thus, 
we can estimate a full information maximum likelihood model. Both a household’s demand and 
supply have a positive probability of being zero, so we need to incorporate the possibility that the 
quantity transacted can be censored at zero. Given data on sample separation, inferred through   18 
ancillary perceived rationing information, identifying observations that correspond to a point on a 
demand curve or supply curve becomes relatively straightforward. The sorting of households is 
explained diagrammatically in Figure 4 The full-observability structure used to estimate the 
formal credit supply and demand parameters, where    f (Di
*j,Si
*j)  is the joint density of the latent 
notional formal sector demand and supply, is discussed in detail below. Using information on 
formal loan amounts and the perceived rationing status, each observation can be placed uniquely 
in one of five cases. 
 
Figure 4: Observed Regimes in the Formal Sector 
 
In case 1 the households have an observed loan quantity of zero, however, they have 
indicated a positive demand for formal credit and reported that they were rationed from the 
formal sector either because they did not possess sufficient collateral or were not willing to risk 
their collateral, that is     D*F > 0 and S*F   0. Thus their contribution to the likelihood function is 
given by the probability that     P(Di
* > 0,Si
*   0 | Xi,Zi).  In case 2, as in the former case, the   19 
observed quantity transacted is zero. The households in this class, however, report a zero demand 
for credit because they perceive themselves to be rationed from the formal sector, that 
is     D*F   0 and S*F   0. The contribution to the likelihood is the 
probability     P(Di
*F   0,Si
*F   0 | Xi,Zi
F) . The final case of zero observed quantity (case 3 in figure 
4) results from households that reported they did have access to formal sector credit, but 
voluntarily opted out of this market. The contribution to the likelihood is the 
probability     P(Di
*F   0,Si
*F > 0 | Xi,Zi
F) . Households with positive observed supply fall in two 
distinct cases. First, in case 4, the quantity transacted in this case is exactly equal to the 
household’s demand for credit. These households reported that they were happy with the amount 
they received. Second, this class (case 5 in figure 4) of borrowers has constrained access to 
formal credit.  Since we have data both on the loan amount transacted and the amount of excess 
demand, in this case we can estimate both the corresponding supply and demand points. The 
contribution to the likelihood function is the joint density of both supply and demand.  The 
likelihood function estimated for the formal sector is simply the sum of all the 5 associated cases. 
The full derivation of the log likelihood function is presented in Appendix A. 
iv.  Estimation of Informal Sector 
Estimation of the disequilibrium model in the informal sector is not as straightforward as the 
formal sector because, unlike in the formal sector, we cannot sort households into the 
observationally distinct regimes. This poses a problem, particularly for the non-participating 
households. In the formal sector model we were able to sort the non-participating households into 
three distinct regimes. In the informal sector, however, since we do not have information about 
the households’ perceived rationing status, we need to use a partial-observability framework and 
jointly estimate the likelihood of being a non-participant. On the other hand, we can sort 
households with observed positive loan amounts in the informal sector, into two observationally   20 
distinct regimes: those with excess demand (constrained borrowers), and those with no excess 
demand (unconstrained borrowers).  The resulting partial observable likelihood function to be 
estimated is the sum of three distinct cases. 
The first group corresponds to the case where households have zero observed loan amount. 
There are three indistinguishable sub-cases. The first sub-case corresponds to the situation where 
households report zero demand because they perceive themselves to be rationed, that is 
     Di
*I   0,Si
*I   0. The second sub-case concerns households who report zero demand and do not 
perceive themselves to be rationed from the informal sector, that is     Di
*I   0,Si
*I > 0. The last sub-
case is one where households report having a positive demand for informal credit but find 
themselves rationed from the sector, that is     Di
*I > 0,Si
*I   0. Thus, the contribution to the 
likelihood of these observations is the probability      P(Di
*I   0,Si
*I > 0 | Xi,Zi
I ) and 
     P(Di
*I > 0,Si
*I   0 | Xi,Zi
I ). The second group consists of households with quantity transacted 
exactly equal to the household’s demand for credit. These households did not report any excess 
demand at the going interest rate. The final group consists of borrowers with constrained access 
to informal credit. Since we have data both on the loan amount transacted and the amount of 
excess demand, in this case we can estimate both the corresponding supply and demand points. 
Collecting all the likelihood terms from the three cases in the informal sector, we can write the 
cumulative log-likelihood which is presented in Appendix B.  The estimation of both formal and 
informal sector likelihood functions requires that there exist sufficient variation between the 
vector of individual characteristics     Xi and Zi
j, j = Formal,Informal .  
v.  Unrestricted and Restricted Specifications of the Models 
We estimate five disequilibrium supply and demand models of loan size outcomes (including 
rationed borrowers), specifically two estimations for the informal sector and three for the formal 
sector.  We run an unrestricted and a restricted version of a pure reputation model for the informal   21 
sector that is consistent with the conceptual model presented in section II.  The unrestricted model 
includes supply side information on titled and untitled wealth holdings, while the restricted model 
uses only “reputation” information related to borrowing and repayment history and borrower 
technical efficiency outcomes.  It is our hypothesis that for the informal sector, the restricted 
model should perform as well as the unrestricted model, because the reputation information 
should be the main driver of loan size outcomes rather than collateral wealth. 
For the formal sector, we first examine an unrestricted version of the pure reputation model 
that is identical to the one we run for the informal sector.  For the formal sector, we expect that a 
primary driver of loan outcomes will be the supply side information on collateral wealth rather 
than pure reputation. Next, we drop all of the reputation information from that specification 
except for a term that captures the interaction of previous formal loans with a technical efficiency 
parameter.  Our second hypothesis is that this restricted version of the collateral leveraging model 
should perform as well as the unrestricted version of the pure reputation model, because the 
formal sector relies primarily on the collateral wealth conditions and only secondarily on the 
borrower’s productivity reputation.  Finally, we run a fuller version of the collateral leveraging 
hypothesis model that includes some additional information on loan history repayment which is 
more fully consistent with the conceptual discussion in section II.  Overall, the results 
demonstrate the distinctive roles that reputation plays in the informal and formal credit markets, 
the primary role of collateral in the formal sector, and more generally the factors that shape 
demand and supply outcomes for loan size in both markets. 
IV.  Data and Estimation Results 
i.  Description of Pertinent Variables 
The data come from a sample of 850 households who were surveyed in 2001 from six 
departments in Honduras. One of the survey modules was dedicated to credit access, and 
included detailed information on the household’s credit market experience, existing credit   22 
contracts, and their perceptions of their ability to access formal and semi-formal credit. Table 1 
uses those questions to show the prevalence of seven categories of borrowers (four in the formal 
and three in the informal sector), the use of the informal sector by formal sector borrower 
categories, and to compare their total owned and total titled land. 
Notice first that 45% of the respondents reported being fully constrained in the formal sector, 
while another 12% reported being partially constrained.  Both of those groups were also active in 
the informal sector with about 25% of the fully constrained and 46% of the partially constrained 
formal sector borrowers securing loans in the informal sector.  These estimates underscore the 
degree to which the informal sector may serve to capture spillover demand from the formal 
sector.  In terms of collateral, the median titled land for those who report being fully constrained 
was zero manzanas of land, compared to 1.90 for those who were partially constrained.  By 
contrast, the unconstrained formal sector borrowers reported a median total of 7.4 manzanas of 
titled land. These differences in titled land across the credit constraint regimes suggest the 
decisive role of collateral wealth in shaping rationing regimes in the formal sector.  Similar 
wealth levels are evident in Table 1 for the informal sector borrower categories, though we do 
not put the same emphasis on those, because we expect other factors, such as reputation, to play 
a more central role in shaping supply outcomes in that market 












      Median  Median 
Formal Sector         
Constrained Non-
Borrowers 
380 (45%)  26.56%  1.92  0 
Constrained Borrowers 
Unconstrained Non-Borrowers 
103 (12%)  45.63%  6.5  1.90 
Unconstrained Non-
Borrowers 
212 (25%)  22.40%  6.12  2 
Unconstrained Borrowers  138 (17%) 
(12%) 
0.0%  11.88  7.38 
Informal Sector         
Non Borrowers  586 (70%)  -  3.06  0.06 
Constrained Borrowers  75 (10%) 
(20%) 
-  6.04  2.50 
Unconstrained Borrowers  172 (20%)  -  10.63  6.0 
   23 
Table 2 summarizes the rest of the data used in the analysis. The amount borrowed in the 
formal sector is simply the value of loans taken from banks and government programs. The 
amount borrowed from the informal sector is similarly defined. Informal sources of credit 
include moneylenders, merchant/traders, agricultural input stores and friends and family. If 
households borrowed from multiple sources within a sector the interest rate was computed as the 
weighted (by loan value) average. The household’s assets are disaggregated as follows. In the 
formal sector estimation we distinguish between the titled land and untitled land whereas in the 
informal sector we do not make this distinction. We justify this distinction on the grounds that 
collateral especially in the form of titled land is central to formal banking, whereas interviews 
with informal lenders (with the exception of moneylenders) suggest that very little emphasis is 
placed on titled land as a form of collateral. In both the formal and informal sector, we include 
the value of non-agricultural land assets as a separate variable. 
The credit experience variables used throughout the econometric analysis are composite 
measures based on the previous decade of loan experience for households.  This is the main way 
that the panel nature of the data is exploited in the paper.  These credit experience variables are 
constructed as indicator variables that identify households as having had positive or negative 
credit market repayment records based on their own reporting. We keep the positive and 
negative credit experience sector-specific so as to determine the extent of information flow 
between the two sectors. Households have a positive record when they have fully repaid 
previous loans without arrears, and negative ones when they have had loans in a sector which 
were in arrears.  The negative credit experience variable includes only information on arrears 
because we do not have default information. Because this is a weaker form of negative history 
than default, evidence that being in arrears on a loan matters would suggest even stronger results 
for more negative credit market behavior. When we test the collateral leverage hypothesis, we 
interact assets, both land and non-land, with credit history indicator variables to capture the idea   24 
developed in Figure 2b in section II that the leveraging of collateral is related to previous 
repayment behavior.    
We use the household’s technical efficiency index to proxy for borrower productivity. The 
technical efficiency index was calculated by comparing the input-output bundle for each farm 
household, within a department, with a nonparametric representation of the frontier technology 
using Data Envelope Analysis. The efficiency indices were calculated at the department level so 
as to condition on regional differences in the frontier technology. Inputs include total agricultural 
area owned, total wealth, number of permanent workers, number of potential household 
agricultural labor force, total cost of variable inputs, and distance to the market. The output 
bundle includes output from permanent crops (measured by an output index for all permanent 
crops), annual crops, vegetables produced for home consumption, salaried income and livestock 
earnings. It may be noted that the estimates of technical efficiency are biased downward due to 
the recent coffee crisis, which resulted in negative income shocks for coffee growing 
households. 
Table 2:   List of Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
VARIABLE  UNIT  MEAN  STD 
DEV. 
MINIMUM  MAXIMUM 
Borrower 
Characteristics 
         
Titled Area in Mz.  manzana  0.85  1.92  0.00  14.39 
Untitled Area in Mz.  manzana  0.56  1.33  0.00  12.45 
Age Household Head  years  5.21  1.61  1.80  9.50 
Titled Area Squared  square 
manzana 
4.40  18.42  0.00  207.07 
Past Loan size as % of 
wealth 
percent  0.03  0.09  0.00  1.24 
Number of Dependents  number  8.48  3.36  1.00  14.00 
Distance to Formal Bank  kilometers  1.19  1.44  0.00  25.00 
Education Household 
Head 
years  2.99  3.31  0.00  20.00 
Employed Household 
Members 
number  0.88  1.10  0.00  6.00 
Formal Interest Rate  percent  26.95  5.15  0.00  43.00 
Informal Interest Rate
*  percent  26.15  5.24  0.00  63.00 




0.05  0.12  0.00  2.09 
Experience  years  25.65  15.82  0.00  83.00 
Technical Efficiency    0.48  0.19  0.01  1.00 
Credit Experience 
Terms 
         
Dummy for Formal sector 
Arrears 
  0.03  0.16  0.00  1.00 
Dummy for Previous 
Formal Loans 
  0.19  0.40  0.00  1.00   25 
Dummy for Informal 
Sector Arrears 
  0.02  0.13  0.00  1.00 
Dummy for Previous 
Informal Loans 
  0.09  0.28  0.00  1.00 
* Note the interest rates are a weighted average of combined loans from a given sector. 
 
Number of dependents, education of household head, number of household members 
employed, distance to formal bank, farm experience and age of household head are the main 
other control variables in the regression. We include the farm experience variable, education, and 
age in the supply equation. Education also is assumed to affect the relative demand for formal 
sector credit, in part because households with less education may find the process of securing 
formal sector credit challenging.  Similarly, the number of dependents, and distance to the bank 
affects the households demand for credit but has no place in the lending decisions. Household 
members with outside employment should decrease the need for credit, since each working 
member can earn wages to finance the households’ productive needs and thus, enters the demand 
equation. It also enters the supply decisions because more family paid workers could potentially 
signal less repayment risk. 
ii.  Estimation Results 
The estimates of our unrestricted and restricted, disequilibrium models of loan demand and 
supply for the informal and formal lending sectors are provided in Tables 3 - 5. Before 
presenting the specific results from these different models, we preview two general results that 
are common to loan outcomes in both sectors. First, a household’s demand for loans is 
significantly and positively related with the index of technical efficiency.  Likewise, this 
measure also plays a significant and positive role in shaping lenders loan supply decisions 
though in somewhat distinctive fashions in the two sectors.  Second, in all five models the 
demand variances are substantially larger than the supply variances.  For example, for the 
unrestricted versions of the pure reputation models (Tables 3 and 4), the demand variances are   26 
195.7, 131.3, I F
D D     = =  while the supply variances are 45.4, 4.9 I F
S S     = = .
7 This large 
difference in variances suggests that the information observed by the econometrician is more 
closely aligned to the information possessed by banks when making lending decisions than it is 
to the borrowers’ information and preferences.  In addition, the consistently lower estimates of 
supply variance in the formal sector (relative to the informal sector) suggest that our estimations 
do a better job of characterizing formal sector credit decisions than informal sector lending 
decisions. This may be explained by the weaker quality of data available on the informal sector 
where we are forced to combine borrowers with no loans into one category rather than the three 
in the full information estimation for the formal sector.  
A close look at the regression estimates in Table 3 provides a revealing picture of the factors 
influencing loan size outcomes in the informal sector.  Starting with the broad role of reputation 
versus collateralized wealth, the coefficient estimates related to previous loan experience, loan 
repayment history, and (again) borrower technical efficiency are all statistically significant in 
loan size outcomes, whereas in the unrestricted model none of the coefficients on collateral or 
non-collateral wealth are statistically significant.  This result is reinforced by the likelihood ratio 
test results between the unrestricted and restricted models of the informal sector which show no 
significant difference between the two, when the restricted model drops all of the supply-side 
wealth measures from the demand-supply estimation.  It is worth highlighting that demand for 
loans in the informal sector is positively and significantly related to the land and asset situation 
of the borrower in both the unrestricted and restricted models.  That outcome seems consistent 
with the notion that wealthier households are more likely to pursue larger projects.   
The role of reputation in shaping loan size outcomes in the informal sector is worth 
detailing.  First, the positive and significant coefficient estimates on informal and formal history 
                                                         
7 Overall, the variance terms suggest that our model provides a more precise prediction of the supply 
decisions. Besides omitted variables, the high demand variances could be due to the homoskedastic error 
structure. Thus, large variations in the sample may contribute to higher variances in the demand equations.   27 
show that borrowers with a previous history of loans are more likely to demand and receive a 
larger loan in the informal sector.  Those results are consistent with a sector that relies on 
reputation.  Second, the negative and significant coefficients on borrowers with a history of loan 
arrears in either sector demonstrate the impact of negative reputation in either sector on 
borrowers’ capacity to secure loans. It seems logical that this negative effect of arrears is much 
stronger for arrears in the informal sector than for arrears in the formal sector which could reflect 
the lack of full transparency across lending sectors or the higher degree of sanctions for arrears 
in a sector that relies more on reputation than collateral.  Again, the positive role of technical 
efficiency in shaping demand and supply for loans in this sector underscores the broader 
conception of reputation developed in the pure reputation model of section II.  
The unrestricted pure reputation model of formal sector loan size is shown in the first two 
columns of Table 4.  It provides a stark contrast to the informal sector results using a similar 
model in Table 3.  In the formal sector, the only supply side coefficient estimates that are 
statistically significant in their effect on loan size outcomes are those related to physical and 
human capital holdings.  Specifically, titled land holdings, non-land assets, and education of the 
borrower are all positively and significantly related to loan supply outcomes (though the positive 
effect of titled land holdings is diminishing given the negative and significant coefficient on the 
quadratic term).  None of the supply side reputation effects that play such a central role in the 
informal sector models in Table 3 prove to be statistically significant in the formal sector 
estimation.  Their lack of importance is further demonstrated in Table 4 by the results in the 
restricted formal sector model which excludes all of the information terms except for one 
discussed shortly.  Again, a likelihood ratio test between the two models in Table 4 reveals that 
they are not significantly different, so that no explanatory power is lost by excluding the 
reputation information variables in the formal sector demand and supply model. 
The one reputation term that is included in the formal sector restricted model is the 
interaction term between a previous loan with the formal lender and the technical efficiency of   28 
the borrower.  That term was part of the conceptual model in section II, and reflects the prospect 
that a formal lender might learn about the productivity of borrowers through repeated 
interactions.  As mentioned above, that term is positive and significant in the restricted model. 
On the demand side of the restricted formal sector model, we note the following outcomes 
depicted in Table 4.  First, as would be expected, the interest rate (price) is negatively and 
significantly related to loan size outcomes.  Second, age is negatively and significantly related to 
loan demand, a result that is consistent with a life-cycle view of rural households.  There are also 
some less intuitive results. One is that total land holdings are not statistically significant in 
shaping demand for loans, though this outcome may be consistent with a sector where many 
households are supply constrained.  Another is that other asset holdings are negatively and 
significantly related to demand for loans which could be explained by the possibility that non-
land assets serve as a substitute source of financing for productive activities.   Finally, distance 
from lender is positively related to the demand for loan size.  That seems somewhat counter-
intuitive, though one might interpret it in the following fashion.  For those who are less 
proximate to other sources of lending where reputation and information play a central role, 
formal sector lending that relies on collateral wealth might be a better bet.  
The last set of econometric results on the formal sector is presented in Table 5. This 
specification provides a more complete portrayal of credit history variables with lenders 
decisions than the restricted model in Table 4.  In particular, the notion of collateral leveraging is 
more fully explored by including an interaction between previous loans and titled land to capture 
the potential dynamics portrayed in Figure 2 in section II.  Overall, the results of this collateral 
leveraging model are consistent with the restricted model in Table 4 (and a log-likelihood test 
shows them not to be statistically different in fit).  However, the additional credit repayment 
history variables tighten the fit of the model and several of them are statistically significant. 
Perhaps most important is the finding that the formal sector tends to use collateral leveraging to 
punish delinquent borrowers.  That is evident in the negative and significant coefficient estimate   29 
on the interaction of arrears with titled land and non-land assets in Table 5, which is consistent 
with Figure 2b’s portrayal of how loan size is shaped by loan repayment history. 
Table 3:  Informal Sector Pure Reputation Parameter Estimates 
  Unrestricted Model I  Restricted Model II 
  Demand  Supply  Demand  Supply 
Constant  -45.85***  -87.04***  -55.32***  -66.73*** 
  (5.35)  (5.52)  (5.28)  (3.561) 
Interest  0.69  0.75*  0.72  0.62* 
  (1.21)  (0.41)  (1.24)  (0.35) 
Total Land Owned (Mz.)  7.94  5.57  9.89*   
  (4.86)  (4.86)  (5.29)   
Total Land Squared    -0.47     
    (0.54)     
Non Land Asset  34.36***  1.66  40.13***   
  (3.16)  (4.49)  (3.55)   
Dependents  6.73*    6.76   
  (3.89)    (4.64)   
Age (Household Head)  -2.09*    -2.06   
  (0.81)    (0.94)   
Education (Household Head)  2.01    1.14   
  (0.81)    (4.45)   
Farming Experience (years)    0.33    0.29 
    (0.26)    (0.27) 
Distance to Bank 
 
0.15    0.07   
  (0.68)    (0.70)   
Technical Efficiency   14.84***  42.60***  12.81***  29.52*** 
  (2.58)  (3.72)  (4.35)  (3.75) 
Informal History  18.50***  32.47***  20.31***  28.13*** 
  (5.91)  (7.84)  (5.57)  (7.09) 
Formal History  50.05***  55.53***  51.25***  53.48*** 
  (8.09)  (6.79)  (4.38)  (7.32) 
Informal Arrears    -61.00***    -84.37*** 
    (8.85)    (8.092) 
Formal Arrears    -26.14***    -12.62 
    (7.29)    (8.05) 
Variance Terms         
    195.52***  46.38***  198.57***  47.44*** 
  (4.73)  (3.27)  (2.96)  (0.097) 
   -0.25***  -0.25***  -0.32***  -0.32*** 
  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.10)  (0.10) 
Log of Likelihood  -1707.93    -1708.48   
 Standard errors in parentheses 
 
*Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5%;    *** Significant at 1% 
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Table 4:  Formal Sector Pure Reputation Parameter Estimates 
   Unrestricted Model  I  Restricted Model II 
  Demand  Supply  Demand  Supply 
Constant  36.74  -1.94  27.67*** 
 
-1.61 
  (13.47)  (1.44)  (3.91)  (1.45) 
Interest  -20.79***  -0.56  -18.27***  -0.66 
  (5.92)  (0.42)  (6.23)  (0.42) 
Titled Land (Mz.)    1.29***    1.31*** 
    (0.32)    (0.30) 
Titled Squared    -0.11*    -0.11*** 
    (0.03)    (0.03) 
Total Land (Mz.)  -0.51    0.04   
  (2.45)    (2.41)   
Non-Land Asset  -33.53  13.03***  -66.17***  13.92*** 
  (21.49)  (2.63)  (23.64)  (2.64) 
Dependents  2.01    2.26   
  (1.75)    (1.62)   
Age (Household Head)  -7.93**  0.18  -7.12**  0.17 
  (3.54)  (0.16)  (3.14)  (0.15) 
Education (Household Head)  0.87  0.15*  1.28  0.15* 
  (1.68)  (0.085)  (1.63)  (0.08) 
Distance to Bank (km)  6.32**    6.22**   
  (3.21)    (3.18)   
Permanent Employees  -0.68  -0.08  -0.41   
  (4.97)  (0.21)  (4.93)   
Technical Efficiency  47.50**    35.93***   
  (21.97)    (11.27)   
Interaction History (Tech. Eff.)    2.55    4.23*** 
    (2.00)    (0.98) 
Informal History  -4.46***  0.43  -2.73   
  (1.23)  (1.07)  (6.85)   
Formal History  -3.09  1.25  0.31   
  (13.01)  (1.10)  (10.36)   
Informal Arrears    -1.06     
    1.81     
Formal Arrears    -0.87     
    (1.48)     
Variance Terms         
    131.25***  4.92***  130.97***  4.94*** 
  (8.30)  (0.38)  (7.75)  (0.37) 
    -0.59***  -0.60***  -0.59***  -0.54*** 
  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.02) 
Log of Likelihood             -2213.20  -2213.91 
  Standard errors in parentheses 
*Significant at 10%  ** Significant at 5%;    *** Significant at 1%  
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Table 5:  Formal Sector Collateral Leveraging Parameter Estimates. 
  Demand  Supply 
Constant  20.77  -1.59 
  (27.16)  (1.34) 
Interest  -16.69**  -0.64 
  (7.60)  (0.40) 
Titled Land (Mz.)    0.97*** 
    (0.28) 
Titled Squared    -0.05* 
    (0.03) 
Total Land (Mz.)  -0.72   
  (2.50)   
Non-Land Asset  -54.73  21.99*** 
  (42.10)  (3.16) 
Dependents  2.46   
  (1.81)   
Age (Household Head)  -6.64*  0.15 
  (3.76)  (0.14) 
Education (Household Head)  1.44  0.14 
  (1.82)  (0.08) 
Distance to Bank (km)  5.30   
  (3.27)   
Permanent Employees  -0.59   
  (5.04)   
Technical Efficiency  35.13   
  (26.36)   
Interaction History (Tech. Eff.)    5.25*** 
    (1.03) 
Interaction History (Titled Land)    0.28 
    (0.32) 
Interaction Arrears (Titled Land)    -0.88** 
    (0.42) 
Interaction History (Non-Land Asset)    -20.61*** 
    (4.58) 
Informal History     
     
Formal History     
     
Variance Terms     
    130.54***  4.55*** 
  (8.359)  (0.35) 
    -0.59***  -0.59*** 
  (0.06)  (0.06) 
Log of Likelihood                    --2201.0186 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* Significant at 10%;    ** Significant at 5% ***Significant at 1% 
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V.  Conclusion 
This article presents an empirical investigation of the impact of borrower reputation and 
collateral leveraging on the notional supply and demand for loans by rural Honduran households 
in the informal and formal sectors. In section II, we conjectured with the help of two conceptual 
models that the evolution of loan size depends on the lenders information context and approach. 
If loans are reputation-driven, then loan sizes depend on a good repayment history and revealed 
productivity. If they are collateral driven, then loan sizes depend on wealth holdings and 
repayment history in the sense that the collateral will leverage larger or smaller loans based on the 
repayment history (and information about the productivity of the borrower).  We undertook an 
econometric estimation of structural disequilibrium models of credit supply and demand for the 
informal and formal sectors using different informational structures - pure reputation as the 
benchmark for the informal sector and collateral wealth leveraging as the benchmark for the 
formal sector - to examine which types of models fit the individual sectors better. We used 
directly elicited information from borrowers to help identify their credit demand and supply 
constraints that may be limiting their access to credit.  Our estimation approach belongs to a class 
of models that incorporate endogenous and exogenous switching models with partially and fully 
known sample separation.  The specifications included a range of models that spanned the purer 
reputation to collateral leveraging approaches with some restricted comparisons to help test 
whether collateral mattered in informal markets and broad reputation measures mattered in the 
formal sector.  The main findings from the estimated models can be interpreted as follows. 
We have shown that borrower reputation is the dominant factor shaping loan size outcomes in 
the informal sector. For example, previous credit market experience decreases the likelihood of 
being rationed by 20% for households at the lowest end of the wealth continuum. The threat of 
severing future credit due to delinquent repayment behavior also appears to be more credible in 
the informal sector, as positive and negative repayment histories are rewarded accordingly, and 
do not depend on direct experience with the particular lender. It is also interesting to note that   33 
technical efficiency (our proxy for productivity) has a strong and significant impact on informal 
sector lending decisions and can have one but only given previous lending experience with the 
borrower in the formal sector as well. These findings are consistent with our conceptual models 
that shows credit market experience and borrower productivity jointly determine future loan 
sizes, though in different ways in the two sectors. In addition, we find that the informal sector 
utilizes borrower credit history from both sectors. Thus, while credit market experience is 
transferable from the formal to the informal sector. However, the reverse is not true. 
In the formal sector, the lack of titled land significantly increases the likelihood of a borrower 
being rationed, and the size of formal loans is directly related to the collateral wealth holdings of 
the borrower.  Meanwhile, general borrower reputation measures have relatively little impact on 
formal sector loan size decisions compared to collateral wealth, and the most significant impacts 
of “reputation” are revealed in the interactions of previous formal credit market experience with 
collateral holdings.  Direct interviews with formal bank officials corroborate this finding that 
lending decisions are linked to collateral and leveraged up based on direct repayment 
performance of the borrower. Furthermore, there seems to be no transferability of credit 
experience from informal to formal sectors.   
Our results bode poorly for efforts to bridge the informal and formal sector markets without 
clear attention to what kind of borrower credit repayment history would be considered valuable to 
formal lenders.  In all likelihood, any effort to increase the use of reputation in the formal sector 
would require contracts similar to informal sector arrangements, which start small and then allow 
the rural poor to build good credit histories, thereby reducing the dependence on collateral assets. 
But, even this suggestion begs a key question regarding whether information, reputation, and 
future loan access are all that the really informal sector lenders “hold over” their borrowers.  If 
their repayment pressures are more implicit (or extra-legal), then it might be difficult to reduce 
the pronounced emphasis on collateral in the formal sector where similar pressures might not be 
feasible.  Put differently, the stark differences we see in the fundamental roles of reputation and   34 
collateral in the informal and formal sector markets raise deeper questions about whether merely 
improving information flows will be sufficient to generate broader and deeper access of 
borrowers to loans in the formal sector.   35 
Appendix A: Likelihood Function for the Formal Sector 
All five observable regimes have distinct components that are as follows: 
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  Collecting all the likelihood terms from the five cases we can write the cumulative log-
likelihood as: 
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Appendix B:  Likelihood Function for the Informal Sector 
The likelihood function has three distinct components: those with observed zero demand, 
constrained borrowers and unconstrained borrowers. The cumulative likelihood function is given 
by:  
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